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Abstract 
There is a vast literature and several surveys on the economic and political resource curse. 
However, the surveys often fail to capture two points: 1) they disregard the relationship between 
this recent literature and the staple theory and the staple trap; 2) the appropriability issue has only 
been treated tangentially and has never been the focus of any survey. The present work fills these 
gaps. This paper shows that the political resource curse approach initially focused on the 
appropriability issue through the lens of ‘looting’ behavior of rebels and distinguished ‘lootable’ 
and ‘unlootable’ goods. However, lootability casts light on mobility of resources or resistance to 
appropriation rather than state appropriability. Borrowing upon Baldwin’s distinction between 
‘point-source’ and ‘diffuse’ resources, the resource curse literature has recently suggested that state 
appropriability is related to pointy-resources. The resource curse/blessing assumes that the 
technical dimension of appropriability and mobility (geographical or purely physical qualities) 
plays primary role whereas institutional dimensions are either absent or play a secondary role. An 
alternative approach gives pride of place to the institutional dimension: the same agricultural 
product such as cereals or coffee can be appropriable or not depending on the institutional 
structure. Finally, while the literature suffers from a confusion between mobility and 
appropriability, its relevance in enhancing an appropriative perspective of the state will be 
underlined.  
Keywords: Captive and fugitive assets, Lootable goods, Natural resource curse, Pointy versus 
diffuse resources, Predatory state, Staple theory 
JEL classification: H1, H4, O1, Q1 
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1. Introduction 
The term natural resource curse was initially coined by economic geographer Richard Auty in 
1993. It has been defined as “the perverse effects of a country’s natural resource wealth on its 
economic, social, or political well-being.” (Ross 2014, p. 2). But what are ‘natural resources’? 
Different definitions have been offered. In earlier writings (Sachs and Warner 1995; Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998), they include not only petroleum and other minerals but also agricultural 
commodities. The latter were excluded in the recent literature since they are produced, not 
extracted, and hence fail to meet standard definitions of natural resources. Moreover, they are 
rarely correlated with unfavorable outcomes such as violent conflicts. Presently, natural resources 
often include petroleum, gemstones, narcotics and other types of minerals. However, certain 
authors still suggest a broader definition of natural resources to capture non-fuel minerals (Sorens 
2011), forest products (Price 2003; Harewell, Farah and Blundell 2011), and commodities more 
generally (Besley and Persson 2011; Bazzi and Blattman 2014). For Ross (2012), the resource 
curse is overwhelmingly an oil curse and can be traced back to the early 1980s. Before the eighties, 
there was not much difference between oil and non-oil states with regard to their tendency towards 
authoritarian governments or their exposure to civil wars. The curse is particularly relevant to 
undeveloped and developing countries. Examples abound: Afghanistan (opium, cannabis, and 
gemstones), Angola (diamond, oil), Colombia (cannabis, gemstones), Democratic Republic of 
Congo (copper), Iraq (oil), Iran (oil), Kurdistan (oil), Nigeria (oil), Liberia (diamond), Myanmar 
(opium, gemstones), Sierra Leone (diamonds), and Sudan (oil).  
Two different meanings of this curse might be distinguished: 1) the economic resource curse; 2) 
the political resource curse (for detailed surveys of the literature, see Bulte et al. 2005; Humphreys 
et al. 2007; Wick and Bulte 2009; Frankel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011). The former is introduced 
as “one of the stylized facts of our times” (Wright 2001, p.1) indicating that resource rich countries 
tend to grow slower than their resource poor counterparts (Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 1995, 
2001). The main economic causes for this type of resource curse that have been identified in the 
literature are the following: Dutch disease models (Neary et van Wijnbergen 1986; Gelb 1988; 
Matsuyama 1992; Torvik 2001; Auty 2001a,b; Leite & Weidmann 2002; Sala-I-Martin & 
Subramanian 2003), corruption and rent-seeking models (Acemoglu 1995; Lane and Tornell 1996; 
Tornell and Lane 1999; Baland & Francois 2000; Mehlum et al. 2006; Deacon and Rode 2015), 
and institutional explanations (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Auty 2004; Snyder et Bhavnani 2005; 
Hodler 2006; Boschini et al. 2007; Deacon 2011; Wiens 2014).  
The political resource curse initially explored in the pioneering works of Mahdavy (1970), Karl 
(1997), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), and Ross (1999) has bloomed in the past decade (Morrison 
2007; Cuaresma et al. 2011; McGuirk 2013). This strand of  works has analyzed the tendency of 
regimes richly endowed with natural resources to be more authoritarian and more prone to civil 
wars than those without such resources (Wantchekon 2002; Collier and Bannon 2003; Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004; Humphreys 2005; Smith 2007; Goldeberg, Wibbels, and Myukiyehe 2008; 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Ross 2009; Aslaksen 2010; Ahmadov 2014). 
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Both strands of economic and political resource curse are basically empirical works and employ 
econometric tests to demonstrate the curse as a stylized fact. Until recently, while most studies 
report evidence of some type of resource curse, a considerably smaller literature either finds 
against the hypothesis (Herb 2005), or finds that the effect of natural resources on regime type is 
conditional on other factors (Dunning 2008). Contrarily to Ross (2001), Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
and Menaldo (2016) question that had Saudi Arabia not become oil-reliant, it might have 
developed the same political institutions as Denmark, provided it would have achieved the same 
per capita income and had fewer Muslims. From an econometric point of view, they argue that it 
is hard to infer causality when the correlation is produced by a technique that primarily exploits 
variance between countries. The authors prefer a country-by-country time-series approach and a 
dynamic panel framework with country fixed effects. Their panel covers 168 countries from 1800 
to 2006. Interestingly their results point to a ‘resource blessing’: “increases in natural resource 
income are associated with increases in democracy.” (Haber and Menaldo 2011, p. 3).  
Reviewing his earlier works, Ross (2012, p. xiii) acknowledges that: «To my embarrassment, I 
found more than a few errors, omissions, and hard-to-defend assumptions. Prompted by some 
smart skeptics-notably Michael Herb, Stephen Harber, Victor Menaldo, Gavin Wright, Robert 
Conrad, Michael Alexeev, Erwin Bulte, and Christina Brunnschweiler-I decided to take a fresh 
look at the data. I discovered some surprises. Things I assumed were true-that petroleum wealth 
was linked to slow economic growth and weak government institutions-were probably wrong.” He 
concedes that extracting oil does not necessarily lead to abnormally slow economic growth, or 
does not make governments weaker, more corrupt, or less effective. However, he still underlines 
the importance of natural (oil) curse since around 1980, and endeavors to explain why some 
countries have escaped the curse, and how resource curse might be turned into resource blessing 
in more countries in the future. In his recent survey of the literature, he claims: “Almost all research 
on the resource curse is based on observational data, which makes it hard to settle these disputes.” 
(Ross 2014, p.2). Similarly, van der Ploeg (2011, p. 366) contends that "empirical evidence 
suggests that either outcome [curse or blessing] is possible". Thus, the literature now embraces 
both a pessimist and an optimist viewpoint of natural resources. The conditional impact of natural 
resources on economic performance is often linked to the quality of institutions. Resource rich 
countries with bad institutions are often poor and remain poor. But what does determine the quality 
of institutions? The empirical evidence allegedly lends credence to the assumption that the quality 
of institutions depends on the appropriability issue.  
The political resource curse literature has initially focused on the appropriability issue through the 
lens of ‘looting’ behavior of rebels and distinguished ‘lootable’ and ‘unlootable’ goods (Le Billon 
2001, Ross 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). By ‘lootability’, it is meant that the natural resource 
can be easily extracted and transported by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers. 
Alluvial diamond is a case in point since it has a high value-to-weight ratio, and can be extracted 
and transported by small groups of unskilled workers. Unlootable resources such as oil, natural 
gas, and deep-shaft minerals cannot be easily extracted and transported. The importance of 
resource ‘lootability’ notwithstanding, it does not embrace state appropriability. In fact, the 
political resource curse literature began to explore the rebel’s behavior and only focused on state 
behavior since the early 2000s. For example, Auty’s ‘two-stage process’ (2004) is an alternative 
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way to look into rebels’ behavior by starting to examine the appropriative activity of predatory 
states as a source of rebellion. Snyder (2006) also underlines the insufficiency of ‘lootability’ to 
explain disorder and civil strife, and proposes a political economy of extraction tackling the ruler-
rebel relationship. In this framework, the main question is to understand who controls the loot. 
This leads us to state and private appropriability of resources in general and the socio-economic 
linkages of natural resources with the fiscal revenues. A new distinction between ‘point-source’ 
and ‘diffuse’ resources was suggested to capture the appropriability issue. “The adverse effect of 
resource dependence on institutional quality and growth is particularly strong for easily 
appropriable “point-source” resources with concentrated production and revenues and massive 
rents such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and plantation crops rather than agriculture (rice, wheat, and 
animals) whose rents are more dispersed throughout the economy, and with easy appropriation of 
rents through state institutions.” (van der Ploeg 2011, p. 384).  
Interestingly, this distinction between ‘point-source’ and ‘diffuse’ resources has already been 
made by Baldwin (1956) and other advocates of ‘staple theory’. It is surprising that the literature 
on natural curse has almost completely disregarded ‘staple theory’ and ‘staple trap’. One exception 
is Auty who acknowledges that his proposal for a ‘two-stage process’ uses “the staple trap model 
of resource-driven economic development to explain growth collapses in resource-abundant 
countries” (Auty 2004, p. 30). In fact, if the major issue is the state appropriability and not 
lootability, why should natural resource curse or blessing be only studied in the context of today’s 
undeveloped or developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and exclude the 
development process of new countries such as Canada, United States, New Zealand, and Australia?   
Staple theory addressed the same problems as natural resource curse in the case of new settlements 
among which many are now counted as developed countries. “Nurske included Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, Uruguay, and possibly southern 
Brazil as members of this distinctive group.” (Schedvin 1990, p. 533). The ‘staple theory’ was 
largely a Canadian addition to economic literature. It tried to show how the growth experience of 
a ‘new’ country was concretely shaped by the specific primary products (staples) which it 
successively exported to world markets. 
While Mackintosh (1923, 1936) provided an optimistic liberal version of steady progress from 
staple production to a broadly based industrial society, Harold Innis’s (1930/1956, 1940/1954) 
classic studies of the fur trade and the cod fisheries highlighted the problems of external 
dependence, distortion, and periodic instability that flowed from a reliance on staples. After the 
Second World War, Staple thesis was generalized and applied to American economic history and 
other countries by North (1955, 1956, 1958, 1959), Baldwin (1956), Watkins (1963), Hirschman 
(1977), and Caves (1963, 1971) 1. Similar to the resource curse/blessing literature, two opposite 
optimist and pessimist versions of staple thesis were advocated. While “there was a pronounced 
                                                          
1Although the theory is originally Canadian, some authors have formulated it independently in other contexts. For 
example, Shafer (1994) develops a sectoral analysis of the developmental prospects of states according to which a 
state’s capacity to enhance economic development depends on the “attributes of the leading sector through which it 
is tied to the international economy: light manufacturing, mineral extraction, peasant cash crop production, or 
industrial planation crop production.” (Ibid, p. 2, emphasis added). While he never explicitly quotes the staple theory, 
he rediscovers it through his comparative political economy.  
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shift towards acceptance of the pasteurized Mackintosh version, Baldwin used the model to explain 
how the Old South was caught in a ‘staple trap’” (Schedvin 1990, p. 534).  
For many authors, ‘staple trap’ implies a distinction between a ‘bad’ (point-source) and a ‘good’ 
(diffuse resource) staple according to their appropriability. A ‘bad’ staple is the equivalent of 
‘resource curse’ and a ‘good’ staple is a ‘resource blessing’. The resource curse/blessing literature 
mainly consists of empirical econometric tests but the early formulation of staple theory is 
theoretical though unsupported by econometric tests. The recent generation of staple theory models 
are backed by econometric tests (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; 
Nugent and Robinson 2010) and are often amalgamated with the resource curse literature.   
The purpose of this paper is to critically review the resource curse literature through the 
appropriability lens. However, since the underpinning tenets of the resource curse literature on 
appropriation are directly borrowed from staple theory, I will systematically highlight the 
contributions of this theory that are often unfortunately unnoticed in most empirical econometric 
studies. The paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the staple trap and 
highlights its commonalities as well as divergences with the resource curse. The third section 
explores lootability and shows why this concept is germane to understand the mobility (or 
immobility) of resources. The fourth section studies the appropriability issue both in the resource 
curse literature and the staple theory. The fifth section examines the technical and institutional 
dimensions of appropriability issue. The sixth section identifies various determinants of mobility 
and appropriability and argues the relevance of the resource curse literature as well as staple theory 
in enhancing an appropriative perspective of the predatory state. A short conclusion will follow.   
2. Staple trap and resource curse  
 
The term “staple” refers to the chief commodity produced by a region. It is customarily regarded 
as describing plantation and non-plantation products, fishing and products of extractive industry. 
Certain authors employ the term as synonymous of ‘exportable commodities and services’ (North 
1955, pp. 247-8). According to Watkins (1963, p. 144), the central concept of a staple theory is 
“the spread effects of the export sector, that is, the impact of export activity on domestic economy 
and society.” To construct a staple theory, it is then necessary to follow Leontief-type input-output 
relationships, and classify these spread effects and indicate their determinants. In Hirschman’s 
terms (1958, chap. 6), the inducement to domestic investment resulting from the increased activity 
of the export sector can be broken down into three linkage effects: backward, forward, and final 
demand linkages. The staple theory can then be formulated as a theory of capital formation. 
Backward linkages lead to new investments in input-supplying facilities and influence the pattern 
of investment activity, notably transport for collection of the staple. Forward linkages are a 
measure of the inducement to invest in industries using the output of the export industry as an 
input; they often stimulate processing and service industries. Together with the final demand 
linkage, which measures the derived demand for consumer goods from staple production, these 
relationships determine the strength of the spread effects from the staple to the economy as a 
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whole2. In addition to these three forms of direct physical (or production) linkages, there is a fiscal 
linkage of the staple that measures the ability of the state to tap the income stream accruing from 
the staple to various parties. The spread effects or linkages between the staple and the domestic 
economy may lead to economic diversification. This is an optimistic version of the staple theory 
advocated by Mackintosh (1923, 1936). During the 1950s and 1960s, most authors shared this 
version and believed in the potent force of staple production for long term economic development 
thanks to linkage effects. Considering the Canadian experience, Watkins (1963) supported that the 
spread effects were mainly one of diversification around an export base. The idea that a staple 
might lack necessary linkages to other parts of domestic economy and fail in generating 
diversification was suggested by some economists but was not considered as a likely outcome 
except in the special case of a slave-based economy. This possibility was dubbed a ‘staple trap’.  
Baldwin (1956) intimated the idea of a possible ‘staple trap’ by introducing a bipolar economy 
comprising of plantation-type economies (like cotton or sugar) based on slave or cheap labor and 
non-plantation type commodities such as wheat. “At one end stand the plantations employing large 
quantities of low wage labor. The other end of the scale is composed of many small, family 
cultivators who operate under a tenure system or perhaps own their land.” (Baldwin 1956, p. 171). 
He argued that the plantation economies had no positive linkage with education and transport 
sectors. The large, low income labor supply in plantation possessed such a low level of education 
and skill that its costs of training represented a large, initial outlay; and they were so impoverished 
that the provision of transportation facilities (other than the minimum necessary for the export 
crop) proceeded very slowly (Baldwin 1956, pp. 172-73). By contrast, non-plantation economies 
such as wheat were prone to education and transportation. “[T]he region with more equitable 
income distribution will be well aware of the stake in improving its comparative position through 
education and research and will accordingly be willing to devote public expenditures in these 
directions.” (North 1959, p. 946). North also underlined the backward linkages of wheat to 
transport notably the railroad. “The expanded foreign demand for wheat in 1846-47 led to a revival 
in westward expansion and stimulus to extension of railroads.” (North 1958, p. 70). 
Inspired by Baldwin’s bipolar economy, Perloff and Lowdon (1961) suggested a distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ resource exports in the American regional growth. While the economy 
may get caught in a ‘staple trap’ due to its reliance on a ‘bad’ staple, it can enjoy sustainable growth 
because of diversification induced by a ‘good’ staple. Staple trap is the equivalent of resource curse 
since it blocks the diversification process. Hirschman (1977, p. 95) strongly disagreed with this 
dichotomous vision of staples: “in almost all of these pairwise comparisons one staple is assigned 
the role of all-around villain, while the other is the all-around hero... In Cuba sugarcane is the 
villain and tobacco the hero, in Colombia tobacco is the bad guy while coffee is the good guy, and 
in Brazil sugarcane is once again the villain while coffee is the good guy (note that as a result of 
these three pairwise comparisons, the ordering of the three staples is actually transitive!).”  
                                                          
2 Several formalized versions of the staple theory have been formulated. Caves (1963) offers an elegant model of ‘vent 
for surplus’ and suggests a connection with neoclassical growth theory.  
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While Hirschman disagreed with the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ staples, he furnished 
some evidence for a staple trap in the case of oil industry and ‘enclave’ economies in general. By 
‘enclave’, Hirschman (1977) meant a staple like oil and other similar mining activities that do not 
involve the rest of the economy, and do not have any productive backward, forward, or final 
demand linkages. In an enclave economy, fiscal linkages become particularly determinant. It is 
precisely because of this absence of connections that the enclave becomes an obvious and 
comparatively easy target of fiscal authorities. “Being a foreign body, often owned by foreigners 
to boot, the enclave has few defenders of its interests once the state acquires the will and authority 
to divert toward its own ends a portion of the income stream originating therein.” (Hirschman 
1977, p. 74). In this sense, strong fiscal linkage in an enclave economy is contradictory with other 
forms of linkages. In fact, if there was a productive activity with many direct links to the rest of 
economy, either because of strong backward and forward linkages or, more simply, because it is 
carried on in the central region of a country by producers with intimate ties to a dense network of 
traders and townspeople, then fiscal linkage would be difficult. “Clearly, with so many friends in 
court this activity is not likely to be subjected to significant special taxation. The situation that is 
brought to mind here is that of coffee-growing countries such as Brazil and Colombia” 
(Hirschman, Ibid, p. 75). 
Interestingly, similar to Hirschman the recent contribution of Mitchell (2011) opposes coal to oil’s 
supposedly curse-like properties from the viewpoint of production process. He gives pride of place 
to the power of coal miners to strike as the basis for gaining the rights to vote, to organize, and to 
create political parties and to democratize European countries in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The linkage effect in the coal industry is explored through the strike movement 
that spread to other interconnected industries of coal mining, railways, docking and shipping 
sectors. In the same vein, Mitchell notes that the oil mines had similar effects in the early twentieth 
century. For example, the oil industry in Baku (in modern-day Azerbaijan) launched protests that 
would eventually result in the 1905 Russian revolution. The ripple effect in oil industry in Baku 
was due to the fact that “The proximity of wells, workshops, pumps, power supplies and refineries 
created a concentrated labor force with the ability to disrupt supplies of energy across a broad 
region.” (Mitchell 2011, p. 34). 
According to Mitchell, international oil companies and governments learnt from these early 
movements. They restructured the management of oil extraction to eschew worker pressures. For 
example, given the distance between oil mines and industrial centers, they exploited ethnic 
divisions or emigrant workers to insulate the oil industry in many countries. Moreover, various 
types of transport (maritime, pipeline, etc.) were developed to protect the delivery of oil in case of 
workers strikes. Although social historians do not always agree with Mitchell’s diagnostic of the 
workers’ movement in oil industry (see for example Atabaki, forthcoming), his contribution is an 
addition to staple theory by identifying a new linkage effect, namely industrial conflict.  
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Despite the original optimist orientation of staple theory, the later version of this theory was more 
pessimist since diversification never happened in Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Uruguay3. 
According to Schedvin (1990, p. 535): “From a late twentieth-century viewpoint, the task of 
successful diversification from an original export base seems to have encountered more obstacles 
than the postwar growth optimists expected… It appears that Canadian experience is the exception 
rather than the rule.” Staple trap is the precursor of resource curse. However, the former is clearly 
established on linkage effects whereas the latter is primarily an empirically based relationship 
supported by a battery of econometric tests. Furthermore, while the former describes the 
development issue in ‘new’ countries, the latter is limited to undeveloped and developing 
countries. Finally, compared to resource curse, staple theory covers a broader group of 
commodities including agricultural products such as wheat, tobacco, coffee, sugar as well as 
fishing and extractive industries. Contrarily to staple theory, the narrower definition of resources 
precluding agricultural products is particularly stressed in political resource curse literature: “It is 
more accurately a mineral curse, since these maladies are not caused by other kinds of natural 
resources, like forests, fresh water, or fertile cropland.” (Ross 2012, p. 1, the emphasis is added). 
Politically speaking, the curse is related to unfavorable outcomes such as intra and inter-states 
warfare. 
3. Lootability and Mobility  
 
Hirschman’s theory of ‘staple trap’ is related to a contradictory relationship between fiscal linkage 
and other types of production linkages. State appropriability is central in this framework. 
Contrarily to this approach, the issue of appropriability has been initially taken on board in the 
resource curse literature with regard to lootability of resources by rebels. The term ‘lootable goods’ 
was coined by Le Billon (2001, p. 569) to describe primary commodities that “are often highly 
amenable to taxing and looting. This lootability arises in part from the fact that resources, and in 
particular extracted ones, are often easily accessible to governments and rebels alike with minimal 
bureaucratic infrastructure. Furthermore, resource extraction activities are, to a greater degree than 
other economic activities, spatially fixed.” Based on empirical observations, Ross (2003) argues 
that among all principal types of natural resources, gemstones (diamonds) and narcotics (opium, 
cannabis, and coca) have been strongly related with the civil wars during 1990 and 2000. These 
goods are distinguished from oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft minerals as “unlootable goods”. 
Although lootable goods are spatially fixed, they are “lucrative and easy-to-transport resources” 
(Snyder 2006, pp. 943-944). 
Following Le Billon (2001), Ross (2003) underlines the significance of “lootable goods” in civil 
wars and identifies three major characteristics for such goods: 1) lootability; 2) obstructibility, and 
3) legality. “A resource’s lootability is the ease with which it can be extracted and transported by 
individuals or small teams of unskilled workers…A resource is obstructable if its transportation 
can be easily blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons…Finally, most resources 
                                                          
3It seems that Kindleberger (1958, p. 14) was quite right in modelling three scenarios with regard to the impact of 
foreign trade on economic development, namely leading, lagging, and balancing effect.  
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can be legally traded on international markets: drugs-coca, opium, cannabis, and their derivatives-
are the main types of illegal natural resources.” (Ross 2003, p. 54). Among these three 
characteristics, lootability is regarded as the most important one and the two others as secondary.  
There is a major difference between Le Billon’s definition of ‘lootable’ goods on the one hand, 
and that of Ross (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), on the other hand. The former defines 
‘lootable’ goods with regard to taxing (government) and looting (rebels) whereas the latter 
associates ‘lootable’ uniquely with the rebel. Lootable as ‘stealable’ is also noted by Leeson (2007 
p. 313) who cites ivory, rubber and wax as “thievable” goods. They are resources that have a high 
value-to-weight ratio, such as gemstones, coca, and opium. The greater this ratio, the greater the 
distance over which an asset might be traded. The reason is that a higher ratio means a greater 
amount of traded value covering the costs of transportation incurred in longer distances. Precious 
commodities such as silk, gold, gemstones, aromatic woods, pepper, rare medicines, and tea were 
non-bulky goods that were worth transporting on long distances. They connected centers to 
peripheries on the basis of exchange rather than political domination. Historically, distant trade 
was generated on the basis of this type of products. But ‘lootability’ in this sense is not synonymous 
with state ‘appropriability’. In fact, unlootable goods are associated with state appropriability, 
since they include immobile assets such as oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft minerals4. Such goods 
are prone to state appropriability but are regarded as unlootable goods. “The more lootable a 
resource is, the more likely it is to benefit a rebel group; the more unlootable it is, the more likely 
it is to benefit the government.” (Ross, 2003, p. 56). Hence what Ross calls lootable goods are 
goods that can escape from the state space and be appropriated by rebels. Lootability refers to the 
capability of escaping or mobility that should not be conflated with state appropriability.  
Vahabi (2016a, chapter 6; 2016b, pp. 157-160) has distinguished ‘mobility’ from ‘confiscability’ 
(coercive appropriation) by the state. In a prey-predator relationship, appropriability depends on 
the ability of the predator to capture and appropriate the prey, whereas mobility refers to the ability 
of the prey to escape. The non-market exit option of an asset hinges upon two distinct criteria: 1) 
mobility, 2) inappropriability (non-confiscable). Appropriability determines the benefits of 
predation and mobility decides the costs of predation. 
“1. Mobility: capable of escaping from a given state space, because they can be easily hidden or 
displaced geographically; this also refers to the possibility of altering political allegiance without 
any geographical displacement.  
2. Non-confiscable: hardly subject to confiscation because (1) any attempt to transfer property 
rights through coercion destroys the asset or reduces its value to almost nil, and (2) the costs of 
confiscation are greater than the benefits of confiscation.” (Vahabi 2016b, p. 158). 
Asset mobility is firstly defined by the easiness of geographical displacement, or the high ratio of 
value to weight and volume, such as alluvial diamonds. Physical or geographical change in 
                                                          
4 Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) claim that primary commodity exports tend to augment the probability of civil 
war. Some other econometric tests about the relationship between civil war and natural resource do not confirm this 
result (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 87; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, pp. 324-325; Hegre 2002). However, empirical 
tests often support that lootable commodities like gemstones and drugs are correlated with non-separatist civil wars, 
whereas oil as an unlootable good is linked to the onset of separatist civil war (for a general survey, see Ross 2004).   
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location is determinant in this respect. Since the state has a power gradient depending on the 
remoteness from the state center (Boulding 1960), there are geographical zones over which the 
state exercises less influence. These areas are inaccessible or hardly accessible for the state. Steep 
hills, marshes, tropical forests and deserts have always been natural refuge zones for escapees 
throughout history. People living on the borderlines of two or several states also detain an 
advantageous position in terms of mobility by crossing the frontiers (e.g., Kurds and Baluchis). 
They may profit from their exit power to reduce the amount of taxes. A salient illustration is 
discussed by Douglass North (1981) regarding lower taxes imposed upon border areas in medieval 
Burgundy due to competition between feudal lords.   
Similarly, Le Billon (2001) drawing on Auty (2001a) makes a distinction between resources that 
are proximate to a national capital (and hence easier for governments to capture) and those that 
are distant (and hence easier for rebels to hold). Auty (2004) largely concurs with Le Billon, and 
introduces the concept of ‘dangerousness of a resource’ which is correlated with two factors: 1) its 
value-to-weight ratio; 2) porous national borders. Resources with higher ratios, like diamonds and 
drugs, are likely to pose greater hazards than those with low ratios, like agricultural commodities. 
But resources with lower ratios might also be dangerous in the presence of remote frontiers. 
“Porous national borders that are remote can permit even low value/weight products like timber 
to generate mobile rents. Significantly, alluvial gems and drugs create point linkages and have a 
high value to weight that renders most national borders porous. Ross confirms that these 
commodities exhibit the highest incidence of conflict.” (Auty 2004, p. 46) 
Mobility in a broader sense includes the invisibility property of assets. Although mobility and 
invisibility are two different properties, they share a common quality in the context of predation: 
inaccessibility to be tracked down. Agricultural crops having the hidden ability like roots and 
tubers (manioc, cassava, potatoes, taro, yams, yucca, etc.) are salient illustrations of ‘escape crops’. 
Scott (2009, Chapter 6, pp. 178-219) has extensively studied several characteristics of this type of 
crops that facilitate evasion of taxing or confiscation by states. In many cases, they simply qualify 
by being well adapted to ecological niches that are difficult to map and control: high, rugged 
mountains, swamps, deltas, mangrove coasts, etc. “Cultivars that require little attention and/or that 
mature quickly are also state repelling inasmuch as they afford more mobility than labor-intensive, 
long maturation crops. Unobtrusive crops of low stature that mimic much of the natural vegetation 
around them thwart appropriation by being easy to overlook. The greater the dispersal of the crops, 
the more difficult they are to collect, in the same way that a dispersed population is more difficult 
to grab.” (Scott 2009, p. 196). Potato is another example of root crops that can insulate states as 
well as stateless peoples against the predations of war and appropriation. McNeil (2007) attributes 
the early eighteenth century rise of Prussia to the potato, while Nunn and Qian (2011) show the 
potato’s contribution to population and urbanization in Old World between 1700 and 1900.  
Following the terminology of resource curse literature, why cannot ‘escape crops’ be classified as 
both ‘lootable’ and ‘dangerous’?  
If ‘lootability’ refers to the capability to escape from state space, then contrarily to what is often 
claimed in the resource curse literature, some agricultural products, namely ‘escape crops’ should 
also be regarded as ‘lootable’ and ‘dangerous’, since they support rebels and escapees and are 
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prone to thwart state appropriability. In this sense, lootable goods embrace not only ‘expensive’ 
gemstones and narcotics but also some ‘poor’ ordinary escape crops. As underlined above, 
lootability addresses mobility and not state appropriability. To understand this latter issue, the 
focus should be shifted from rebels to rulers and states. A major controversial issue on the 
motivations of rebels (‘greed versus grievance’) was perhaps one of the elements that delayed this 
shift for some time.  
Advocates of ‘greed’ assumption were often focused on rebels’ motivation rather than predatory 
states, since: “Only a small minority of any society are psychopathic, but these people are likely 
to be in the front of the queue for rebellion.” (Collier 2009, p. 135). In dire contrast, proponents of 
‘grievance’ assumption, sought the roots of civil war in the state’s unjust behavior. Collier and 
Hoeffler (1999) and Collier (2000, 2007, 2009) aver that greed variables predict civil war better 
than grievance factors do. Injustice might exist but it does not necessarily provoke resistance. 
Moreover, rational insurgents are assumed not to follow their leaders’ slogans about social justice 
since there is a problem of time-inconsistency, i.e. no credible commitment by leaders. They may 
defect and renege on their mobilizing pledges. Instead, appealing to people’s motivation for 
immediate satisfaction through looting may solve the collective action dilemma. To test their 
hypotheses, the authors constructed proxies for greed and grievance.  
The share of primary commodities in total exports, the ratio of young males in the total population, 
and the number of years devoted to schooling among young males are supposed to be the elements 
of a composite indicator that measures greed or loot-seeking. The rationale for this proxy is that it 
tallies the ease of immediate taxation by looting. The average years of schooling pertains to other 
economic occupations accessible to young males relative to the use of violence or looting. 
Grievance or justice-seeking is represented by another composite indicator including ordinary 
economic indicators for growth in the five years prior to the outburst of conflict, scores of 
repression and restricted political rights, inequality and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. In Collier 
(2000), socio-economic grievance is measured in terms of ‘vertical’ inequalities i.e. income or 
land ownership inequalities among individuals or households rather than social groups. According 
to the data, vertical inequality has no effect on the risk of conflict. But what about ‘horizontal’ 
inequalities? 
 
Based on an extensive study of violence in multiethnic societies, Stewart and her associates (2008) 
argue that empirical evidence lends credence to the assumption that grievance in terms of 
horizontal inequalities, namely “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural 
status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart 2008, p. 3, emphasis is added) are major 
sources of civil wars. Horizontal socio-economic inequalities have not always led to civil wars. 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Ghana are a few cases that have been explored by the contributors to Stewart 
(2008). The authors suggest that in those cases, the leadership of disadvantaged minorities has 
been politically coopted by the dominant group. To put it differently, the pursuit of a politically 
and economically inclusive strategy by the ruling group tends to ameliorate social conflicts.  
 
Moreover, the proponents of the ‘grievance’ assumption have critically assessed the proxies of 
Collier and Hoeffler. For example, Cramer (2002, pp. 1851-1854) discusses several shortcomings 
of these proxies and considers them as a “patchwork”. Keen (2012, pp. 761-62) questions Collier 
and his associates’ proxies for greed and grievance. For instance, lack of access to education is 
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taken as a proxy for greed. However, Keen (2005) persuasively argues that lack of access to 
education might justifiably be coded as a proxy for grievance in cases like Sierra Leone. Similarly, 
Collier, Hoeffler and Sӧderbom (2006) consider low per capita income and low slow growth as 
proxies for the feasibility of rebellion, since they reduce the recruitment cost of rebel army. But 
they might be better as proxies for grievance. The problem is that by changing the meaning of 
proxies, one can arrive to diametrically opposite results.     
 
The advocates of the grievance approach do not deny the role of greed or economic motivation in 
fueling violence. In fact, they were among the pioneers of studies about war yielding benefits and 
economic beneficiaries of conflict (Keen 1994, 1998; Reno 1997; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001; 
Duffield 2001). However, these authors insist on a dynamic and complex interaction between 
greed and grievance (Keen 1994; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). They claim that even in situations 
where greed furnishes a strong driving force for violence, a variety of grievances underpin greed. 
For example, the link between natural resources and conflict is well established. But while 
proponents of the greed perspective often interpret this link as ‘rebel greed’, Stewart, Brown and 
Langer (2008, p. 294) note that “the conflict-inducing potential of natural resources is often 
mediated through their impact on HI [horizontal inequalities], and that this can translate both 
separatist struggles and local-level conflict.” Grievance breeds greed and vice versa. Grievance 
may cause war, but war and predation generate, in their turn, inequalities, lack of trust, severe 
shortages and greed in having access to desired scarce foods, energy or other resources. Similar to 
proponents of ‘grievance’ thesis, Mann (2005, p. 516) criticizes Collier and Hoeffler with regard 
to the recent African insurgent movements: “Most African insurgent movements begin with 
genuine organic nationalist ideologies; only later do they degenerate under conditions of civil war 
stalemate into criminality.”   
 
Auty (2004) and Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) suggested a “two-level analysis” that starts with the 
state’s behavior to capture the rebel’s behavior. “Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and 
Laitin (1999)…do not address the crucial prior question of how governments get (or fail to get) 
the revenue to pay for military expenditures in the first place. Our integrated focus on government 
revenue and spending gets beyond this limitation.” (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, p. 567). 
Accordingly, the authors propose an alternative framework: “Our framework departs from 
previous research on resources and civil war by shifting the focus from rebels to rulers and states, 
analyzing the institutional and economic constraints that determine the ability of rulers to get the 
income with which to govern, and combining this focus on revenue with a focus on spending.” 
(Ibid., pp. 565-566). Instead of ‘lootability’ or mobility, they suggest to first study state 
appropriability or ‘unlootable’ goods. This leads to a revenue-centered theoretical framework that 
shifts the focus from rebels to rulers and states, and situates rulers in the context of the institutional 
and economic constraints on their ability to earn revenue, and combines this focus on revenue with 
a focus on state spending.  
 
This is exactly the same line of research that Auty (2004) had suggested in his “two-level analysis”. 
But starting with state appropriability instead of lootability brings the resource curse literature 
closer with the staple theory. Interestingly, Auty is one of the rarest authors who explicitly refers 
to the staple trap: “This article…uses the staple trap model of resource-driven economic 
development to explain growth collapses in resource-abundant countries, which appear to be a 
necessary pre-condition for civil strife, but not a sufficient condition. The study therefore goes on 
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to identify two basic properties of natural resources related to civil strife, namely the pattern of 
socio-economic linkages produced by the commodity and the mobility (‘lootability’ in the 
terminology of Ross) of the resource rent. The socio-economic linkages may be either ‘point 
source’, which means they are concentrated on a handful of economic agents, like large-scale 
mining, or they may be diffused among many agents, like peasant crops. The former are more 
likely to engender conflict.” (Auty 2004, p. 30). This passage is very important since it clearly 
acknowledges that lootability only captures mobility and not state appropriability. Moreover, Auty 
concedes that the staple trap may provide a theoretical explanation for political resource curse. 
Finally, he clearly builds his model on Baldwin’s bipolar economy: a pointed-resource (mining) 
and a diffused one (peasant crops like wheat). The former plays the role of the bad guy and is 
assumed to be the source of civil strife, while the latter is the good guy. Interestingly, the distinction 
does not preclude ordinary agricultural products. 
 
4. Pointy versus diffuse resources and appropriability  
 
The distinction between pointy versus diffuse resources on which Auty (2004) built his staple trap 
model could be traced back to Auty (2001a, b). Analyzing transition economies, Auty (2001a, b) 
pointed out that resource-rich countries with pointed-resources like oil fields are conducive to 
predatory oligarchic governments, fractional polities promoting narrow sectional interests. These 
countries drift toward bad policies and suffer from rentier effects and are often hindered from 
diversification and competitive industrialization. To put it differently, pointy or concentrated 
resources lack socio-economic linkages to enhance economic growth but are prone to 
appropriative activity. By contrast, diffuse resources involve socio-economic linkages and 
promote productive activity leading to capital accumulation. Baldwin’s division of resources into 
pointy and diffuse strongly influenced Auty’s work in understanding the appropriability issue.  
Baldwin’s bipolar economy has been adopted by other versions of staple theory in which pure 
geographical factors play a deterministic role. While Baldwin and Hirschman’s view advocates 
socio-economic linkages, a recent version of staple theory adopts a purely geographical distinction 
of resources. In Baldwin (1956), pointy resources are distinguished from diffuse resources with 
respect to the presence or absence of socio-economic linkages rather than geographical dimension. 
While diffuse resources induce socio-economic linkages such as transport and education, pointy 
ones do not generate them. According to Watkins (1963, p. 147): “In the plantation case, the 
dominant group with its rentier mentality on the one hand, and the mass of slaves who are 
prevented from bettering themselves on the other, can produce a set of institutions as inimical to 
entrepreneurial activity as is to be found in any tradition-ridden society. Business pursuits may be 
castigated as “money grubbing”; education-which, as North has emphasized, is very important-is 
likely to be confined to the elite and to slight the development of technical and business skills; 
political activity tends to be devoted to the defense of the status quo. On the other hand, in the 
family-farm case, as in wheat areas, the more equal distribution of income can result in attitudes 
towards social mobility, business activities, education, and the role of government which are more 
favorable to diversified domestic growth.” Hirschman (1977) prolonged Baldwin’s and Watkins’ 
versions of staple theory in which a staple’s impact on the whole economy through various forms 
of linkages becomes a theory of capital formation. He also added fiscal linkage to other forms of 
linkages to capture the role of state in the economy.  
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By contrast, a recent version of staple theory modelized by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), 
Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) does not follow Baldwin's bipolar economy and suggests a 
tripartite classification of New World colonies on the basis of purely geographical distinctions. 
This version is supported by econometric tests and conflated with resource curse literature. The 
tripartite classification is as follows.  
1) Staple crops like sugar and other highly valued crops associated with large slave plantations in 
the West Indies, Barbados, Cuba, and Jamaica, as well as in South America (mainly Brazil).  In 
this category, the overwhelming fraction of the populations was black of African descent. The 
distributions of wealth and human capital were extremely unequal among free and slave 
populations. 2) Rich mineral resources combined with substantial numbers of natives surviving 
contact with the European colonizers in Spanish America, some islands in the Caribbean, and 
colonies such as Mexico and Peru. “Building on preconquest social organizations, whereby Indian 
elites extracted tribute from the general population, the Spanish authorities adopted the approach 
of distributing enormous grants of land, often including claims to a stream of income from the 
native labor residing in the vicinity, and of mineral resources among a privileged few” (Sokoloff 
and Engerman 2000, p. 221). 3) European descent small-owners producing grain in the northern 
part of the North American mainland-chiefly those that became the United States, but including 
Canada as well. “Compared to either of the other two categories of New World colonies, this class 
had rather homogenous populations…With abundant land and low capital requirements, the great 
majority of adult men were able to operate as independent proprietors” (Ibid, p. 223).  
This tripartite division of ‘new’ economies is based on factor endowments, and the relative 
relationship of free/unfree labor to abundant/scarce land. The origins of appropriative regimes in 
the first two types of economies versus productive regimes in the third one are sought in initial 
factor endowments. Accordingly, the institutional differences are explained by purely 
geographical distinctions: “In this chapter, we explore the possibility that the role of factor 
endowments has been underestimated and the independence of institutional development from the 
factor endowments exaggerated.” (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, p. 261). This version of staple 
theory has found an important echo in the resource curse literature.       
Auty’s distinction between diffuse versus pointy resources has been a source of inspiration for 
many other authors in the resource curse literature like Le Billon (2001, p. 570), Ross (2003, p. 
53); Isham et al. (2005, pp. 141, 143, 150-152) ; Bulte et al. (2005, pp. 1031-32), Wick and Bulte 
(2006, pp. 457, 461-462), Boschini et al. (2007, p. 597); Busse and Gröning (2013, p. 3), as well 
as Wiens (2014, p. 218). While Auty’s distinction between pointy versus diffuse resources is based 
on Baldwin’s version of staple theory, his followers in the resource curse tradition have often 
advocated a purely geographical distinction. For example, Isham et al. (2005, pp. 148-149) 
explicitly refer to Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) in defining 
diffuse versus pointy resources as ‘factor endowments’ and Bulte et al. (2005, pp.1031-32) 
contend that point resources are extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base and include 
oil, minerals, and plantations. Since these resources are spatially concentrated, they can be 
protected and controlled at a relatively modest cost. The implication is that countries with abundant 
point resources end up with worse institutions, and their governments perform poorly along several 
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dimensions. Conversely, countries with abundant diffuse resources show no tendency to pursue 
this pattern. Similarly Wick and Bulte (2006, p. 457) state that “economies that are abundantly 
endowed with diffuse resources (resources spread thinly across space), typically grow faster than 
countries with resources that are geographically clustered (or “pointy”). Similarly, Ross (2004) 
shows that pointy resources trigger and prolong conflicts whereas diffuse resources do not.” 
The problem with both geographical and economic-linkage description of resources is that they 
both disregard the specific institutions in which any natural resource might be used by economic 
agents. For example, the production of wheat or cereals may be diffused or concentrated depending 
on the institutional structure (particularly property rights) in which they are produced.  
Certain leading theorists of the staple theory are cognizant of the relevance of institutions in 
defining diffuse staples. Borrowing Baldwin’s bipolar economy to explain the American economic 
growth, North (1955, 1956, 1959) underlines in the first place the difference between the American 
market-oriented agriculture with the European subsistence economy. “From the early joint-stock 
companies on through the whole westward expansion, a basic objective was to exploit the land 
and its resources in order to produce goods that could be marketed “abroad” and would bring in a 
money income. This is in marked contrast to the experience of Europe (which appears to be the 
model for the early stages of the theory of regional economic growth), where a market-oriented 
economy emerged only gradually from the predominantly local economies of manorial system. If 
a subsistence economy existed in a new region in America, it was solely because of a lack of means 
of transport, a condition that was swiftly remedied by the concerted efforts of the settlers.” (North 
1955, pp. 245-246, emphases are added). The wheat exploitation in the U.S. in the nineteenth 
century was diffused since it was based on small-private market-oriented production. The diffusion 
in wheat production was neither geographical nor economic. Geographically speaking, cereals 
should be considered as a pointy resource, since they were grown on densely concentrated alluvial 
or loess soils. From an economic linkage point of view, cereals have always been the nervous 
system of most economies and can be described as diffuse if this quality is attached to crops 
conducive to large socio-economic networks. But if diffuse implies hardly appropriable, then 
cereals are not qualified to be diffuse. In this latter sense, they are rather pointy, since historically 
speaking, cereals have always been one of the most appropriable crops. 
Indeed, as Scott (2009, Chapter 3, pp. 64-97) has already shown, all the pristine agrarian states in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus Valley, and Yellow rivers, were grain states: wheat, barley, and millet 
(in the case of Yellow River). If state is understood as an institution of coerced appropriation of 
labor and resources or tax-collection by a specialized hierarchical bureaucracy of officials, then all 
the archaic states were based on concentrated manpower, grain slavery and irrigated rice. 
“Conditions in a flourishing wet-rice heartland, then, were favorable to the development of what 
might be called the premodern state’s ideal subjects. That ideal is represented by density packed 
cultivators of permanent grain fields who produce a considerable annual surplus. Having put 
considerable labor into their padi fields, over generations, perhaps, they are all reluctant to pack 
up and leave. They and their rice fields are, above all, fixed in space, legible, taxable, conscriptable, 
and close at hand.” (Scott, Ibid, p. 65). There is an intimate relationship between cereals and state 
formation, since only this crop could serve as the foundation of taxation. Contrarily to ‘escape 
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crops’ discussed in the preceding section, cereal grains are visible, legible, storable, and divisible. 
“A premodern ruler in mainland Southeast Asia would have been less interested in what today 
would be called the gross domestic product (GDP) of his kingdom than what we might call its 
“state-accessible product” (SAP!)…The state-accessible product had to be easy to identify, 
monitor, and enumerate (in short, assessable), as well as being close enough geographically.” 
(Scott, Ibid., p. 73). In short, Scott distinguishes two types of cultivars with regard to state-
appropriability. Cereals are state-appropriable whereas tubers and roots are escape-crops in non-
capitalist, non-market economies based on forced labor. The former is the basis of state space, the 
latter is state-repelling.   
Scott’s idea has been recently modelized by Mayshar et al. (2015)5. The authors propose that the 
emergence of social hierarchy in the aftermath of the Neolithic Revolution was because of the 
elite’s capability to appropriate cereal crops from cultivators and not a result of land productivity 
as claimed in conventional theory. “Thus, regional differences in the suitability of land for roots 
and tubers, which are less appropriable, or cereals, which are more appropriable, can lead to 
differences in the formation of hierarchy and state institutions, and thereby explain persistent 
differences in economic development.” (Ibid, p. 1).  
The appropriability of cereals has several implications: 1) ordinary agricultural products should 
not be excluded in discussing the appropriability issue. Historically, cereals were at least as (if not 
more) important as oil and minerals in state-building. Similarly, escape-crops were at least as (if 
not more) important as diamonds and narcotics in helping rebels and escapees to resist the rulers. 
2) The distinction between pointy and diffuse is not purely geographical or economic but also 
institutional. Geographically concentrated grain on alluvial soil might be treated as institutionally 
diffuse or pointy depending on the property rights. For example, in the absence of world market, 
the grain produced in a subsistence economy under a communal or slavery system might be treated 
as a pointy resource whereas the same agricultural product produced for world market economy 
under small private ownership of land is a diffuse resource. Cereals in their ‘natural state’ provide 
only the object of appropriation but their appropriability is conditioned by enforced institutional 
rules. Hence, the appropriability issue entails both technical (physical qualities including 
geographical location) and institutional dimensions.    
5. Technical and institutional appropriability  
A natural resource is an economic asset when it becomes appropriable. According to the property 
rights school, an asset is valuable not only because of its physical properties, but rather by the 
allowed rights of action over the asset. “(T)he value of what is being traded depends upon the 
allowed rights of action over the physical good and upon the degree to which these rights are 
enforced” (Demsetz 1964, p. 18). There are two important concepts in Demsetz’s definition of 
economic value, namely ‘right’ and ‘enforcement’. This brings us to delineation and enforcement 
of property rights. Both of them are costly and it would be necessary to balance the benefit from 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, the authors do not acknowledge Scott’s pioneering work in this respect. While their model captures 
Scott’s distinction between these two types of cultivar in archaic agricultural economies, their approach to the state as 
provider of public goods (Mayshar et al., Ibid, pp. 4, 6) is diametrically opposite to Scott’s viewpoint of the state as a 
predatory institution.  
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delineating property rights against the costs (Cooter and Ulen 2012). Purely physical 
characteristics of natural resources cannot be the source of any ‘curse’ unless these resources have 
been transformed into assets. In fact, when Humphreys et al. (2007), Ramsay (2011), Beck (2011) 
and Ross (2012) consider the ‘volatility of oil revenues’ as a major source of oil curse6 and as a 
“collateral”7, they assume that what is decisive is that oil is no more a pure natural resource but an 
economic asset. In this sense, ‘appropriability’ necessarily entails two dimensions: technical and 
institutional.  
 
According to Boschini et al. (2007, p. 594), the effect of resources is not determined by resource 
endowments alone, “but rather by the interaction between the type of resources that a country 
possesses, and the quality of its institutions. This combination of factors determines what we call 
the appropriability of a resource.” Two major issues are raised in this passage: 1) the type of 
resources rather than the ‘abundance’ of resource endowments in general is important in 
understanding the effect of resources on the appropriability; 2) the incidence of specific type of 
resources on the appropriability is conditional on the institutional quality.  
 
The first issue is ignored in a strand of work concerning the impact of natural resources on 
appropriability. For example, the “voracity effect” (Lane and Tornell 1996, 1999) measures the 
extent of rent-seeking or appropriative activity of organized powerful groups following an increase 
in the rate of return of common resources such as oil. Put differently, any increase in the oil revenue 
in Venezuela, Nigeria, or for Trinidad and Tobago where such powerful groups are dominant, 
provoke a voracity effect: the private consumption of these groups surpasses the amount of 
increase. The appropriative activity of powerful groups reduces growth rate due to the voracity 
effect. The model ignores the specific institutional matrix of society. In the same vein, Torvik 
(2002) has developed a theoretical model of rent-seeking where resource abundance increases the 
incentives to invest in ‘grabbing’ activities to capture the rents from the resources. These papers 
predict a monotone-adverse effect of natural resources on economic growth and they do not 
differentiate between the effects of different types of resources.  
 
By contrast, Auty (1997), Woolcook et al. (2001) and Isham et al. (2005) have emphasized the 
importance of different types of resources. While Boschini et al. (2007) follow this line of research, 
they underline that the relationship between natural resources and growth is non-monotonic in 
institutional quality and differently so depending on the type of resources (Boschini et al., Ibid, p. 
597). Their result is in tune with Mehlum et al. (2006) predicting that resources have a non-
monotonic effect on growth depending on the quality of institutions. Mehlum et al. have developed 
a formal model in which entrepreneurs choose between becoming ‘producers’ or ‘grabbers’. The 
relative payoff from these activities depends on how ‘grabber-friendly’ or ‘producer-friendly’ the 
institutions are, which also determines the effect of natural resources on the economy. This third 
                                                          
6 Humphreys et al. (2007, p. 6) summarize three sources of income volatility: “the variation over time in rates of 
extraction, the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations in the value of the 
natural resource produced.” A fourth source of volatility is international lending that follows oil “boom-bust cycles” 
(Ibid, p. 8).  
7 Oil can serve as collateral, or at least as an informal guarantee, since “the oil earnings are easy to identify and direct 
toward debt servicing.” (Humphreys et al. 2007, p. 8). 
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strand of literature correctly emphasizes on both technical and institutional appropriability. But 
how are these two elements of appropriability understood? 
Boschini et al. (2007, p. 595) define the technical appropriability of any resource by reference to 
their physical and economical characteristics. “Resources which are very valuable, can be stored, 
are easily transported (or smuggled) and are easily sold are, for obvious reasons, more attractive 
to anyone interested in short-term illegitimate gains. This suggests that resources such as diamonds 
or precious metals are potentially more problematic than, say, agricultural products.” While the 
concept of technical appropriability is germane to classifying different types of natural resources, 
the suggested definition suffers from a confusion between ‘mobility’ and ‘appropriability’. What 
the authors call ‘technical appropriability’ is the same as ‘lootability’, since it pertains to “short-
term illegitimate gains” relating to alluvial (and not Kimberlite) diamonds or precious metals. In 
other words, the definition captures lootability of resources by bandits, rebels, and thieves rather 
than states. For example, oil is not easily transportable and should be classified as technically 
inappropriable according to the authors’ definition despite its appropriability by a state. Moreover, 
following the resource curse literature, ‘agricultural products’ are excluded. But why should tubers 
and roots be excluded from the authors’ definition of appropriability by rebels and escapees? In 
my viewpoint, the authors conflate technical appropriability with technical mobility8.  
 
A second dimension of appropriability is institutional appropriability: “The potential problem of 
having certain types of resources can be countered by having good institutions…institutional 
quality determines the institutional appropriability of a resource.” (Boschini et al., Ibid., p. 595). 
The issue of institutional appropriability is conflated with ‘institutional quality’ measured by 
empirical indicators concerning how democratic a country is. Polity from the Polity IV data set or 
sub-components of the Institutions measure as suggested by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(2002) regarding ‘a state of law’ have been employed to gauge the quality of institutions (Ibid, p. 
612). Contrary to this method of measuring institutional quality, Wiens (2014) argues that there is 
no systematic relationship between fiscal reliance on resource revenue and a country's level of 
democracy. Instead, he suggests that we should expect: “(1) resource dependence to be 
systematically related to a country’s likelihood of establishing restrictive institutions; and (2) that 
this relationship is conditioned by the nature of a country’s institutions prior to the onset of 
resource-dependence.” (Wiens 2014, p. 212). Restrictive institutions are not necessarily 
democratic ones, but they control the power of rulers. Considering institutional path dependency, 
it is assumed that if rulers’ power is restricted before fiscal reliance of the state on resource 
revenue, then the curse will not occur. But to what extent ‘resource appropriability’ is conditional 
on democratic or restrictive institutions? Consider the Shah’s regime in Iran during the period of 
agrarian reform (1962-1971). While his personal autocracy was strengthened due to the ‘White 
Revolution’, the combination of agrarian reform and the increasing oil revenue led to capitalist 
development, economic diversification and economic growth (Katouzian 1978; Hooglund 1982). 
The military dictatorship under Pinochet was not particularly restricted either, but the Chilean 
economy experienced economic growth and diversification. To put it differently, while some 
predatory states hinder economic development, others enhance it. There may be an empirical 
association between the institutional quality and institutional appropriability under certain 
conditions, but that does not prove that there is a direct causal relationship between them. In my 
opinion, institutional appropriability is directly related to the nature of political competition and 
                                                          
8 This difference will be substantiated in the next section.  
 19 
 
the backgrounds of political elites defining property rights and enforcement. This point is 
substantiated in a recent version of staple theory9 developed by Nugent and Robinson (2010).  
 
Investigating institutional differences of the coffee exporting economies of Latin America, namely 
Costa Rica and Colombia on the one hand, and El Salvador and Guatemala, on the other, Nugent 
and Robinson show that the different forms the coffee economy took in the nineteenth century was 
critically determined by the legal environment conditioning access to land. These differences in 
legal environment were driven in their turn by differences in the nature of political competition 
and the backgrounds of political elites. According to them, the “proximate cause of the difference 
is that both Colombia and Costa Rica passed laws rather like the 1862 Homestead Act in the United 
States, protecting smallholders and allowing them to gain title to land. On the other hand, in El 
Salvador and Guatemala, the onset of the coffee boom induced a mass land grab by powerful 
political elites who took possession of both Indian and free land themselves and created large 
coffee plantations. Alongside such land grabs came extreme labor repression.” (Nugent and 
Robinson 2010, p. 50). But why did the political elites in these countries choose different strategies 
in taking advantage of the nineteenth century coffee market? Two factors have been identified: 1) 
the size of the army; 2) the nature of elites.  
While the army was rather tiny in Costa Rica and Colombia, it was much stronger in El Salvador 
and Guatemala. The first factor explains why in Costa Rica and Colombia, the state did not have 
the required coercive means to expropriate land and engage in systematic labor repression. By 
contrast, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the army was used to trap captive agricultural laborers in 
large plantations. Moreover, in Costa Rica and Colombia, the merchants formed the political elites 
whereas in El Salvador and Guatemala, the elites were primarily composed of landowners. 
Consequently, in Costa Rica and Colombia, the elites chose to control commercial activities by 
monopolizing finance, credit provision and exportation of the crop. The combination of a tiny 
army and merchant political elites led to a relative preference for smallholder production and 
protection of property rights in Costa Rica and Colombia. Contrary to these countries, in El 
Salvador and Guatemala, the combination of landowners as political elites and stronger 
militarization induced a relative preference for large plantations. The authors also explain the lack 
(presence) of forward and backward linkages in these two types of Latin American coffee 
exporting countries in terms of political competition and the nature of political elites. “There is a 
natural connection between the type of coercion that characterized the labor market in El Salvador 
and Guatemala and the refusal of the state to invest in education. Unlike physical capital, human 
capital is only productive if workers exert complementary effort. But in a labor market based on 
coercion, workers were unlikely to believe that they would receive any return from exerting effort. 
In consequence, it is unlikely that there would be much payoff to landowning elites for investing 
in schools or the human capital of their workers.” (Nugent and Robinson 2010, p. 51). The authors 
provide a new version of Baldwin’s bipolar economy in which the distinction between diffuse and 
                                                          
9 Nugent and Robinson (2010, p. 47) explicitly refer to “the powerful set of ideas developed in the context of the 
‘staple thesis’”. But they consider that endowments are not fate and that “Contrary to the nascent literature in economic 
attempting to explain institutional differences, our research suggests that the equilibrium institutional structure is not 
uniquely determined by factor endowments and depends crucially on the nature of political cleavages and competition 
in society.” (Ibid, p. 54).  
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pointy resources are applied to the same product. Coffee is a diffuse resource in Costa Rica and 
Colombia, in contrast to El Salvador and Guatemala where it is a pointy resource. The explanatory 
factor is no more physical characteristics or geographical location of a product, but its institutional 
environment. Put differently, there is no ‘good’ and ‘bad’ resource; the same resource might be 
bad or good depending on the political competition and the nature of political elites. 
Another interesting point of this recent version of pointy versus diffuse resources is that 
institutional appropriability is not linked to the presence or absence of democracy. The political 
regimes in Costa Rica and Colombia were neither democratic nor restrictive. Merchants like their 
landowner counterparts were predatory, but they contributed to a diffuse political economy instead 
of a pointy one. But did these differences in terms of political economies reflect themselves in the 
type of assets that have been developed? This issue has not been addressed by Nugent and 
Robinson (2010).  
In fact, Nugent and Robinson are more focused on rulers than assets. But the investigation about 
political competition might be conducted on the basis of the way the strategies of political elites 
could influence the structure of mobile/immobile assets.  Costa Rica and Colombia were not 
democratic countries but their merchant elites had a preference for mobile assets (merchant 
capital), whereas landowners in El Salvador and Guatemala enhanced immobile assets (landed 
property). The structure of assets can be studied exogenously or endogenously. The geographical 
or purely physical characteristics describe the type of assets as given exogenously, but the 
strategies of political elites affect the assets’ structure endogenously. Nugent and Robinson 
contribute to an endogenous theory of assets’ structure that explains how the mobility and 
appropriability of assets can be influenced by the political strategies of elites. This brings us to 
reexamine both technical and institutional determinants of mobility and appropriability.   
6. Determinants of mobility and appropriability 
 
As mentioned above, Boschini et al. (2007) conflate technical appropriability with ‘lootability’ or 
mobility. We need to scrutinize the technical and institutional dimensions of both mobility and 
appropriability.  
The technical mobility refers to all the physical characteristics of assets that make them mobile or 
give them hidden qualities. Several factors influencing technical mobility have been identified in 
section 3. Institutional mobility refers to all the rights of action that make assets mobile. This 
includes 1) allegiance shift; 2) rights of free entry, exit and circulation. Allegiance shift alludes to 
the fact that “Exit is not always associated with a physical move: people can decide to choose a 
different protector. This has been a common occurrence throughout history, and lords have often 
competed in demanding payments for protection in almost the same territory (Lane 1958/1979; 
Volckart 2000a, b). Hence, even geographically attached people might be ‘mobile’ in the sense 
that they have an ‘exit power’ and can choose their provider of protection.” (Vahabi, Ibid, p. 162). 
Mobility is also a consequence of extending the rights of action through institutional change. The 
abolition of feudalism and the agrarian reform is a salient illustration of institutional change that 
extended peasants’ mobility. The institutional mobility of peasants deeply impacted the army’s 
structure in its turn. The birth of mass army with the French revolution provides a good example. 
“In an economy with a peasant majority, soldiers often consist of peasant conscripts paying their 
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tributes to the king or lord. On the abolition of feudalism, peasants acquire an exit option and the 
army has to be restructured… In the [French] ancien régime, the army was aristocratic. Soldiers 
as subjects had no rights; the nobility had all the rights. Given the higher exit option of liberated 
peasants from the yoke of feudalism, the army had to provide them voice so that they could find 
their place in a modernized, reformed army as citizens, not subjects.” (Pietri et al. 2017, p. 270, 
brackets added).  
 
Hence, physical characteristics of assets or their geographical location are not the unique 
determinants of mobility. Allegiance shift and institutional change extending the rights of action 
over assets endogenously determine the mobility of assets. Wiens (2014) notices this institutional 
dimension of mobility when he discusses bargains between rulers and constituents with respect to 
exit option. “To secure their support, rulers bargain with prospective supporters, offering policy 
concessions in exchange for the required support. To shed light on the structural conditions 
underwriting these bargains, Clark et al. (2013) present a game-theoretic treatment of Hirschman’s 
(1970) ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ argument. Their model shows that a ruler is compelled to limit 
himself and provide public goods wherever two conditions are met. First, he depends on the 
cooperation of some group of citizens to consolidate and sustain his rule. Second, the citizens on 
whose cooperation the ruler depends have credible ‘exit threats’; that is, they can withhold their 
support without making themselves worse off than they would be were they to cooperate and 
provide the ruler with revenue.” (Wiens 2014, pp. 202-203) 
 
Mobility or the prey’s ability to escape should not be confused with appropriability or the 
predator’s capability to capture the prey. In the staple theory and resource curse literature, the 
appropriability issue has been explored through pointy versus diffuse resources. Pointy resources 
in terms of geographical concentration are regarded as appropriable and diffuse ones as 
inappropriable. However, appropriability has also two dimensions: technical and institutional. 
According to Vahabi (2016b, pp. 162-164), four principal10 determinants are germane in rendering 
assets technically more or less appropriable:  
 
(1) State accessibility of assets: State accessibility is dependent on the geo-political location of 
assets and on industrial and military technological progress in transportation, communication and 
strike zones. 
 
(2) Concentration or dispersal of assets: More concentrated assets are more accessible and 
appropriable. Dispersion is the enemy of appropriation for two reasons: it increases invisibility, 
and it augments the costs of accessibility and measurement.  
 
(3) Asset specificity: An asset is more vulnerable to theft and coercive appropriation when it is 
more generic, because it can be more easily redeployed without losing value. A more specialized 
asset is more difficult to appropriate because its redeployment will incur the loss of quasi-rents 
from specific investment. 
 
                                                          
10 There are many other secondary factors such as ‘storability’ or ‘perishability’ of assets, their ‘vulnerability to 
disease’, and their character as ‘labor-intensive’ or ‘capital intensive’ that impact the appropriability of assets 
(regarding the impact of these factors on crops see Scott 2009, pp. 202-204). However, Vahabi only focuses on primary 
factors influencing all types of assets (physical as well as pecuniary ones).  
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(4) Asset measurability: Accountability and controllability are essential in administering and 
appropriating assets. The more generic an asset is, the less costly its measurement will be since 
generic assets are often more homogeneous. By contrast, the more specific an asset is, the costlier 
its measurement will be because of its idiosyncratic, nonhomogeneous profile.  
 
The institutional appropriability is not synonymous with institutional quality11. Assuming 
predatory states in a multi-predatory environment, institutional appropriability depends on the 
structure of political competition at domestic, regional and international levels. Two major types 
of competition are predatory and price competition. The former is violent competition between 
states, and the latter is competition à la Tiebout among different political units (Pietri et al. 2017). 
As Nugent and Robinson (2010) underline, the nature of political competition is shaped by the 
army’s size, and the backgrounds of political elites that comprise the dominant social coalition. To 
these factors, I would add international political relationships. The identity of the dominant social 
coalition is particularly important in explaining the source of state’s revenue and its expenditures. 
Political elites can influence the structure of assets with regard to appropriability and mobility. 
What is the state’s major source of revenue: taxes over productive activity or revenue from 
extractive resources such as oil? And in case of fiscal states, the question is whether the taxes are 
exacted over immobile assets such as landed property, or over mobile assets such as merchant, 
financial and industrial capital. Regarding the state’s expenditure, three key areas should be 
distinguished: (1) tax capacity, (2) coercive capacity, and (3) social welfare (Snyder and Bhavnani 
2005, p. 571). Different types of political regimes constrained or non-constrained by a finite time 
horizon like autocratic, semi-democratic, and democratic have different priorities in their 
expenditure (Ibid, p. 573). This study shifts the focus from rebels to rulers. In other words, while 
‘mobility’ tackles the rebel’s behavior, appropriability deals with the ruler’s actions.  
 
The resource curse literature often confuses mobility and appropriability, but in some cases authors 
implicitly acknowledge the difference between them in a technical sense. For example, Auty 
(2001b) and Le Billon (2001) underline a determinant of the technical mobility, namely the 
geopolitical location of resources with respect to a national capital to measure the relative 
advantage of rebels compared to the state in grabbing distant resources. On the other hand, they 
point out a determinant of technical appropriability, i.e. the pointiness or diffuseness of resources 
in terms of geographical concentration. The two distinctions are related to the special 
characteristics of resources and their mode of control and production: “the characteristics of 
control can define resources as proximate or distant while those of access can distinguish them as 
point or diffuse.” (Le Billon 2012, p. 28).  
 
Le Billon suggests a combination of both criteria to yield a fourfold typology of conflict: 1) point-
source resources proximate to the capital are not easily movable and are appropriable. Since they 
are easily controllable by the state, only coup d’états could change the regime. 2) point-source 
resources distant from the capital are appropriable but movable and not easily controllable by the 
state. Thus secession movements can grab these resources. 3) diffuse-resources proximate to the 
capital are hardly appropriable but are not movable. Since they are hardly controllable by the state, 
they generate rebellions and rioting. 4) diffuse-resources distant from the capital are hardly 
                                                          
11 The conventional indicators for institutional quantity are not appropriate to measure the institutional appropriability. 
New indicators with regard to the army’s size, elites’ background, the type of state’s revenue and spending, and its 
geopolitical position in international politics (among others) are warranted to capture the institutional appropriability. 
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appropriable and are movable. Hence, they induce warlordism or autonomous political territories. 
Table 1 summarizes Le Billon’s results. 
 
Table 1: Resource Characteristics and Conflict Types 
Characteristics Point Diffuse 
Proximate Coup d’état Mass rebellion 
Distant Secession Warlordism 
Source: le Billon (2012, p. 29)12 
 
It is noteworthy that Le Billon’s argument is not that oil or any other resource should be linked to 
conflicts in a deterministic fashion, but that the “characteristics of resource sectors provide a 
context for political mobilization as well as for the motivations, strategies and capabilities of 
belligerents.” (Le Billon 2012, p. 29).  
 
The valuable foresight of this fourfold typology in analyzing potential conflictual situations 
notwithstanding, it suffers from a major shortcoming: both distinctions are used to determine 
different forms of rebellion rather than to explore the predatory nature of the state. Consequently, 
the two criteria of mobility and appropriability are not explicitly distinguished with regard to the 
state’s appropriative capacity. They are treated as geopolitical and geographical criteria of 
‘accessibility’ and ‘controllability’. Accordingly, the institutional dimension of mobility and 
appropriability is disregarded. Moreover, since the rebellion has been the focus of study, all other 
technical and institutional factors that can cast light on the frontiers of a predatory state have been 
overlooked.  
 
Vahabi (2016a, b) develops an alternative approach by focusing on a positive theory of the 
predatory state based on mobility and appropriability criteria. According to his theory, the booty 
value of an asset13 should be distinguished from its economic value. While the economic value of 
an asset is its value in a voluntary (market) transaction, its booty value is the amount of value that 
can be transferred or allocated through coercive capture of the asset. For the state, what matters is 
the booty value of an asset. The booty value of an asset depends on its exit option determined by 
the benefits of appropriation and the costs of capture. Combining the two criteria of appropriability 
and mobility, assets can be classified according to their booty value for the state. An ‘asset-
appropriating’ perspective of the state is opposed to a ‘public goods’ approach: “Instead of 
focusing on private versus public, it is necessary to investigate assets as less or more easily 
captured. Considering the two criteria, appropriability and mobility, all assets may be regrouped 
into four major categories: (1) pure fugitive assets that satisfy both mobility and non-
appropriability criteria; (2) mixed fugitive assets that satisfy the mobility criterion but are 
appropriable; (3) mixed captive assets that do not satisfy the mobility criterion but are non-
appropriable; (4) pure captive assets that are both appropriable and unmovable. In reality, state 
space is not decided by goods and services that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, but rather 
by pure captive assets.” (Vahabi 2016b, p. 160) 
                                                          
12 Le Billon (2001, p. 573) illustrates the same table with country examples for each case of conflictual situation. Le 
Billon (2012, pp. 28-42) acknowledges other relevant factors such as legality, transportability, obstructability and 
substantiates his fourfold categories. 
13 This includes all type of goods such as agricultural products like cereals and famine goods; and is not limited to 
natural resources such as oil, narcotics, diamonds, or other gemstones.  
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While pure fugitive assets (category 1) are out of the state space, and pure captive assets (category 
4) belong to the state space, the ‘mixed fugitive assets’ as well as the ‘mixed captive assets’ 
(categories 2 and 3) are intermediary assets and have ambivalent positions with regard to the state 
space. They can become part of a state space or undertake political exit; everything depends on the 
outcomes of the bargains between the state and the owners of these assets. 
 
The appropriative perspective of the state integrates the potential conflictual situations over 
resources in relation to their booty value or exit option. The afore-mentioned classification is 
applicable not only to natural resources but to all types of assets. In this sense, the literature on the 
resource curse might be regarded as a particular case of a general theory of the predatory state. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
There is a vast literature and several surveys on the economic and political resource curse. 
However, these surveys often fail to capture two points:  
1) They disregard the relationship between the resource curse literature and the staple theory and 
the staple trap. A probable explanation may be the importance of empirical econometric tests in 
the recent curse/blessing literature in contrast to the early formulations of staple thesis that were 
not supported by such empirical tests. However, the recent staple theory models are often backed 
by a battery of empirical tests and they are now often mixed with resource curse literature. Many 
econometricians, more sensitive to econometric techniques than theoretical framework, have not 
yet taken cognizance of the fact that their tests on diffuse versus pointy resources are rooted in the 
staple theory.  
2) The appropriability issue has only been treated tangentially and has never been the focus of any 
survey. In this paper, I showed that the political resource curse literature had initially focused on 
the appropriability issue through the lens of ‘looting’ behavior of rebels and distinguished 
‘lootable’ and ‘unlootable’ goods. However, lootability casts light on mobility of resources or 
resistance to appropriation rather than state appropriability. Our critical review points out that the 
political resource curse only focused on state behavior since the early 2000s. A new distinction 
between point-source and diffuse resources was suggested to capture the appropriability issue. 
Interestingly, this distinction had already been made by Baldwin (1956) and other advocates of the 
‘staple theory’. My contention is that the underpinning tenets of the resource curse literature on 
appropriation are directly borrowed from the staple theory. 
The present work fills these two gaps and casts light on a few major issues. First of all, the resource 
curse approach is applied to underdeveloped and developing countries, whereas the staple theory 
addresses ‘new’ economies including Canada and the United States. Borrowing upon the staple 
theory regarding pointy versus diffuse resources challenges the limitations of the resource curse 
approach. Can’t the resource curse be reinterpreted as a form of staple trap applicable to all 
countries?  Similarly, why should resource curse be limited to a certain group of products and 
exclude ordinary agricultural goods such as cereals, tubers and roots?  
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The second point is the relationship between technical and institutional dimensions of resources. 
While the staple theory underlines different types of economic linkages (forward, backward, 
demand, fiscal and industrial conflict), the resource curse/blessing approach insists on geopolitical 
and geographical aspects of resources. In both cases, the technical dimension (geographical or 
purely physical qualities) is assumed to be primary. Institutional dimensions of appropriability and 
mobility are either absent or play a secondary role in their explanations. An alternative approach 
gives pride of place to the institutional dimension: the same agricultural product such as cereals or 
coffee can be appropriable or not depending on the institutional structure. 
The third point is to explore different determinants of technical and institutional mobility and 
appropriability. The institutional aspect of mobility includes 1) allegiance shift; 2) rights of free 
entry, exit and circulation. The size of the army, political competition and the nature of elites have 
been identified as the source of institutional appropriability. 
Finally, the fourth is to document a confusion between state appropriability and lootability 
(mobility). This distinction is fundamental in developing a positive theory of the predatory state. 
Exploring the sources of conflictual activities according to the nature of resources, a strand of work 
has suggested a combination of two criteria, namely the controllability and accessibility of 
resources. The former is related to pointiness or diffuseness of resources; the latter to the 
geopolitical distance of resources from the capital. In this sense, controllability partially measures 
state appropriability and the accessibility gauges the lootability by rebels. While this classification 
is purported to examine the conditions of rebellion, it implicitly enhances an appropriative 
approach to the state. The resource curse/blessing literature could be an additional support to a 
general positive theory of the predatory state.  
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